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INTRODUCTION
The last decade witnessed the abandonment of central economic planning and the
introduction of market economies in Central and Eastern European countries and
elsewhere, the start of the internal market and a process of deregulation in the
European Union, and a self-propagating upsurge of globalization of economic ac-
tivities. This process is likely to get a further impulse from the imminent start of
the Economic and Monetary Union. These developments were parallelled by an
increased interest of the economics profession in studying the functioning and
performance of markets.
In October 1996, the Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology
and Organizations ~METEOR! organized a conference on the subject ‘Firm and
Markets: Performance and Dynamics’. Many contributions to the conference dealt
with research in the areas of competition and industrial dynamics, science and
technology and industrial policy, performance and new ﬁnancial markets.
The current special issue of De Economist is devoted to research contributions
in these areas. Rather than trying to cover the ﬁeld of the functioning of markets
and industrial economics to its full extent, the editorial board has opted for a
selection of topics which could be grouped under the heading: ‘Market Dynamics
and Innovation’.
The ﬁrst two selected papers review major parts of the literature while the last
three make contributions to industrial economics and market analysis and illus-
trate three different methodologies currently used in the ﬁeld, i.e. theoretical, ex-
perimental, and empirical analyses, respectively. The ﬁrst paper reviews the theo-
retical literature of the past twenty years on market structure and innovation. The
second paper focuses on collaboration in research and development, assessing
both theoretical and empirical ﬁndings. The third paper is concerned with tech-
nological competition. It analyses the persistence of monopoly and the relation-
ship between the intensity of competition, leadership and investment in research
and development. The fourth paper examines a different topic. It analyses market
transparency as a mechanism in the competition process between ﬁnancial mar-
kets. It discusses results from theoretical studies and from experiments carried
out by the authors, among others. The last paper presents results from an empiri-
cal analysis of the determinants of the life expectancy of Dutch newspapers over
the last 150 years using duration models.
In the ﬁrst paper, P. van Cayseele provides a survey of the theoretical contri-
butions on the relationship between market structure and innovation activity over
the last decades. He structures the debate by using Schumpeter’s two hypotheses
on innovative activity as a guiding principle. Schumpeter’s ﬁrst hypothesis states
that increased market concentration induces more innovative activity. The second
hypothesis claims that there is a positive relationship between ﬁrm size and in-
DE ECONOMIST 146, NO. 3, 1998
De Economist 146, 387–390, 1998.
©1 9 9 8Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.novation. From the literature up to 1975, it became clear that there is no mono-
tonically increasing relationship between market concentration and innovative ac-
tivity. The degree of rivalry in R&D appeared to be one of the key variables in
fostering inventive activity. Also, the distinction between market structure before
and after the innovation appeared to be crucial in understanding the determinants
of inventive activity. To provide some reward to the inventor, market structure
after the innovation should have some monopolistic features. Empirical research
in the years up to 1975 suffered from the presence of the two-way causality be-
tween market concentration and innovative activity.
In the decade up to 1985, applied game theory researchers were much con-
cerned with understanding the role of rivalry in fostering innovations. Patent races
were studied. One remarkable conclusion arose from these efforts: independent of
the number of ﬁrms inside or outside an industry, there will be just one or no
successful inventor. The market structure before the innovation was found to be
largely irrelevant in this theoretical literature which also studied the market dy-
namics resulting from patent races. As is nicely explained by Van Cayseele, the
decade from 1985-1995 led to further reﬁnements of the game-theoretic models
by showing under which conditions the number of ﬁrms in a market and that of
potential entrants is irrelevant for the process of innovative activity, thereby con-
tradicting Schumpeter’s ﬁrst hypothesis in these cases. Finally, Van Cayseele re-
views Sutton’s ~1997! bound approach which states ranges for the predictions
from the theoretical literature which hold for a large class of models, indepen-
dent of the speciﬁc assumptions underlying these models. This approach opens
new promising ways for empirical work in industrial economics.
In terms of scope, the contribution by R. Veugelers is a companion paper to
Van Cayseele’s survey. It reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on co-
operation in R&D. Increased inter-ﬁrm networking, aimed at the production of
innovations more than at the dissemination and exchange of knowledge, is ob-
served on a large scale. Motives for this form of collaboration are sharing of
costs, risks and complementarities in know-how, markets and products, and the
control of competitive forces. In industrial organisation ~IO! most research on
R&D cooperation is concerned with horizontal cooperation. As illustrated in
Veugelers’ survey, the IO literature generated results that are fairly robust across
a variety of different models. Spillovers and complementarities are the main de-
terminants of R&D cooperation. Risk-sharing is also mentioned but not exten-
sively discussed. Competitive considerations in the transfer of knowledge are
found to be of great importance. When spillovers of knowledge exceed some criti-
cal level, R&D cooperation appears to be beneﬁcial to the partners involved and
seems to be welfare-enhancing. Difficulties in verifying the amount of R&D in-
puts in an alliance, asymmetric spillovers and incentives to cheat request special
attention. Careful design of alliances can overcome these problems and turn R&D
cooperation into stable, proﬁtable partnerships. As pointed out by Veugelers, em-
pirical research indicates that industry and partner characteristics ~such as simi-
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bility of R&D cooperation.
The article by Boone and Van Dijk analyses the relation between the intensity
of competition and R&D expenditures at the sectoral level. Intensity of competi-
tion is deﬁned in a novel way by introducing conditions in the proﬁt function in
such a way that increased competition makes efficiency differences between ﬁrms
more pronounced. A cost advantage becomes relatively more valuable as compe-
tition is increased. A neat example of a model with two ﬁrms is presented, in
which the chance of innovation depends on R&D expenditures. In the case of
equal costs ~symmetry!, more intensive competition induces higher R&D invest-
ments. Symmetry is considered as the outcome of licensing. In the case of un-
equal costs ~asymmetry!, the persistence of leadership holds a central place in the
discussion. More intense competition leads to higher total R&D expenditures if
R&D investment is very cheap or effective, or if the replacement effect domi-
nates the vested cost effect. The authors link their results to Schumpeter’s two
hypotheses ~see also Van Cayseele!. They show under which conditions their theo-
retical ﬁndings are consistent with these hypotheses. Finally, the implications for
empirical work and for policymaking are discussed.
The contribution by Huisman and Koedijk examines the role of market trans-
parency in the competition process between ﬁnancial markets. It analyses the im-
pact that different trading mechanisms have on the structure of a ﬁnancial mar-
ket, its efficiency, and liquidity. The article reviews some theoretical literature on
micromarket structure and reports results from experiments carried out by the au-
thors. The results are used to interpret and explain recent developments on Eu-
ropean ﬁnancial markets. The main thesis in this article is that trading mecha-
nisms determine the transparency of the market. Transparency inﬂuences the
strategic behaviour of market participants and through this it has a major impact
on the competition between exchanges. The authors discuss the different impli-
cations of pre-trade and post-trade transparency on market efficiency and liquid-
ity. In a dynamic setting, the difference between the two concepts needs some
further consideration. If a market is post-trade transparent, it will be pre-trade
transparent in the next stage, except if the information gathered by a participant
is not immediately disclosed publicly. If a market is not post-trade efficient, it is
not clear how it will become pre-trade efficient in the next stage of trading. As
with R&D investments that are costly, for the market to provide some transpar-
ency, participants must have an incentive to collect information, a process that is
costly too. One way to provide an incentive is to make the information collected
by a market participant proprietary – at least for a short period of time. The larger
the amounts to be traded, the more important this incentive becomes. Because
the expected gains from collecting information that is not immediately disclosed
are much higher for large traders than for participants trading small amounts, the
dual market structure is expected to arise: a highly efficient market for small
trades that is pre- and post-trade transparent coexists with a market that tempo-
389 INTRODUCTIONrarily does not disclose information and therefore exhibits higher search costs but
is more attractive for large trades.
The article by Van Kranenburg, Palm, and Pfann studies important features of
the life cycle of an industry. It analyses determinants of the life expectancy of
daily newspapers in The Netherlands since 1848, when freedom of the press was
written into the Constitution of the Kingdom of The Netherlands. The analysis is
carried out using duration models. The liability of aging is found to be U-shaped.
During early ages, duration dependence is found to be negative, that is, the haz-
ard rate of leaving the market decreases with age. The exit probability increases
when newspapers grow older. Among the determinants of life expectancy, one
can mention the competition intensity measured by the number of newspapers
present in the market one year before the newspaper enters the market, the tur-
moil of World War II, indicators for regional appearance. The positive impact of
the regional dummy variables on life expectancy of newspapers can be inter-
preted as the effect of a regional niche on survival. The ﬁndings of the article are
in line with those implied by the bounds approach put forward by Sutton ~1997!.
They are also in line with the ﬁndings of other recent studies investigating the
life expectancy of new product markets.
To conclude, while we realize that many other interesting topics could have
been chosen, we believe that the selected articles provide the reader with useful
and up-to-date information on the state of knowledge in several areas of indus-
trial economics. Moreover, the studies presented report ﬁndings from three dif-
ferent types of analysis: theoretical, experimental, and empirical.
Th.C.M.J. van de Klundert and F.C. Palm
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